Electrode positions, transformation coordinates for ECG reconstruction from S-ICD vectors.

The article contains data pertaining to the reconstruction of an 8-lead ECG from 2 subcutaneous implantable cardioverter defibrillator vectors. The location of electrodes on the precordium required for the data collection are detailed; the flow chart for patient selection and exclusion is shown; the summary data of the root mean square error (RMSE) (in microvolts) and Pearson r for the ECG transformation all cases and the pearson correlation for all the leads measured and reconstructed leads are also shown. Detailed background, methodology and discussion can be found in the linked research article

A Model of Vertical Oligopolistic Competition

This paper develops a model of successive oligopolies with endogenous market entry, allowing for varying degrees of product differentiation and entry costs in both markets. Our analysis shows that the downstream conditions dominate the overall profitability of the two-tier structure while the upstream conditions mainly affect the distribution of profits. We compare the welfare effects of upstream versus downstream deregulation policies and show that the impact of deregulation may be overvalued when ignoring feedback effects from the other market. Furthermore, we analyze how different forms of vertical restraints influence the endogenous market structure and show when they are welfare enhancing

Vertical integration and firm boundaries : the evidence

Since Ronald H. Coase's (1937) seminal paper, a rich set of theories has been developed that deal with firm boundaries in vertical or input–output structures. In the last twenty-five years, empirical evidence that can shed light on those theories also has been accumulating. We review the findings of empirical studies that have addressed two main interrelated questions: First, what types of transactions are best brought within the firm and, second, what are the consequences of vertical integration decisions for economic outcomes such as prices, quantities, investment, and profits. Throughout, we highlight areas of potential cross-fertilization and promising areas for future work

Derivation of optimal spatial prices

The price of a good prevailing at some local market point may or may not be identical to the price of that same good at another market point. Price differentials over regions depend in part upon the number and locations of firms which sell to these regions, and on the demand curves of buyers. The present paper evaluates the price policy of a firm selling over a set of linearly extended buying points. It derives the optimal spatial prices under alternative assumptions of consumer behavior and demand. It demonstrates mathematically as well as graphically that a spatial monopolist maximizes profits by subdividing his market into economic submarkets, utilizing fob mill prices for some submarkets, and optimal discriminatory prices for the remaining ones. Thus it explains the use of fob pricing over selected distances in a firm's market area notwithstanding the apparently greater profitability of a discriminatory price policy throughout a firm's market space.